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Abstract. We study the computation of equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms that
may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game’s payoff function, assumed to be
unknown initially. The general topic we consider is query complexity, that is, how many queries
are necessary or sufficient to compute an exact or approximate Nash equilibrium.
We show that exact equilibria cannot be found via query-efficient algorithms. We also give an
example of a 2-strategy, 3-player anonymous game that does not have any exact Nash equilibrium
in rational numbers. However, more positive query-complexity bounds are attainable if either
further symmetries of the utility functions are assumed or we focus on approximate equilibria.
We investigate four sub-classes of anonymous games previously considered by [5,15].
Our main result is a new randomized query-efficient algorithm that finds a O(n−1/4)-approximate
Nash equilibrium querying O˜(n3/2) payoffs and runs in time O˜(n3/2). This improves on the
running time of pre-existing algorithms for approximate equilibria of anonymous games, and is
the first one to obtain an inverse polynomial approximation in poly-time. We also show how
this can be utilized as an efficient polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS). Furthermore,
we prove that Ω(n log n) payoffs must be queried in order to find any ǫ-well-supported Nash
equilibrium, even by randomized algorithms.
Keywords: Algorithms, Computational complexity, Game theory
1 Preliminaries
This paper studies anonymous games, in which a large number of players n share a constant
number of pure strategies, and the payoff to a player depends on the number of players
who use each strategy, but not their identities. Due to this property, these games have a
polynomial (in n) size representation. [15] consider anonymous games and graphical games to
be the two most important classes of concisely-represented multi-player games. Anonymous
games appear frequently in practice, for example in voting systems, traffic routing, or auction
settings. Although they have polynomial-sized representations, the representation may still
be inconveniently large, making it desirable to work with algorithms that do not require all
the data on a particular game of interest.
Query complexity is motivated in part by the observation that a game’s entire payoff
function may be syntactically cumbersome. It also leads to new results that distinguish the
difficulty of alternative solution concepts. We assume that an algorithm has black-box access
to the payoff function, via queries that specify an anonymized profile and return one or more
of the players’ payoffs.
1.1 Anonymous Games
A k-strategy anonymous game is a tuple (n, k, {uij}i∈[n],j∈[k]) that consists of n players, k pure
strategies per player, and a utility function uij : Π
k
n−1 −→ [0, 1] for each player i ∈ [n] and every
strategy j ∈ [k], whose domain is the set Πkn−1 := {(x1, . . . , xk) ∈ INk0 :
∑
j∈[k] xj = n− 1} of
all possible ways to partition n−1 players into the k strategies. The number of payoffs stored
by any such game is n · ∣∣Πkn−1∣∣ = O (nk), i.e., polynomial in n if k is a constant, which we will
always assume throughout this paper. In the special case of k = 2, we regard uij’s input as
being the number of players other than i that play strategy 1. The number of payoffs stored
by a 2-strategy game clearly is then 2n2. As indicated by uij’s codomain, we make a standard
assumption that all payoffs are normalized into the interval [0, 1].
Let ej denote the unit vector of length k with 1 at its j-th component. A mixed strategy
of player i is represented using a random vector Xi, which takes value ej with the probability
that i plays j. Letting pij be the probability that player i plays strategy j, we then have
E[Xi] =
(
pi1, . . . , p
i
k
)
. Let X−i :=
∑
ℓ∈[n]\{i}Xℓ be the sum of n−1 such random vectors, where
the subscript −i denotes all players other than i. The expected utility obtained by player
i ∈ [n] for playing strategy j ∈ [k] against X−i is
E[uij(X−i)] :=
∑
x∈Πkn−1
uij(x) · Pr[X−i = x].
Let X := (Xi,X−i). If i is playing a mixed strategy (pi1, . . . , pik), her expected payoff simply
consists of a weighted average, i.e.,
E[ui(X )] :=
k∑
j=1
pij · E[uij(X−i)].
For two-strategy games, the strategy played by player i can be represented by a Bernoulli
random variable Xi indicating whether or not i plays strategy 1. Hence, a mixed strategy for
i simply is the probability pi := E[Xi] that i plays strategy 1. Similarly to the k-strategy case,
let X−i :=
∑
ℓ∈[n]\{i}Xℓ be the sum of all the random variables other than Xi. The expected
utility obtained by player i ∈ [n] for playing pure strategy j ∈ {1, 2} against X−i is
E[uij(X−i)] :=
n−1∑
x=0
uij(x) · Pr[X−i = x].
The probability mass function (p.m.f.) of X−i and X−i respectively are a Poisson Multinomial
Distribution and a Poisson Binomial Distribution. Both of them can be computed in polyno-
mial time using dynamic programming (see e.g., [15]), i.e., expected utilities are computable
in polynomial time.
1.2 Exact and Approximate Nash Equilibria.
With the above notation, we say that Xi is a best-response if and only if E[ui(X )] ≥ E[uij(X−i)]
for all j ∈ [k]. A Nash equilibrium (NE) requires the players to be best-responding to each
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other; therefore, the above best-response condition must hold for every i ∈ [n]. This can be also
viewed as no player having an incentive to deviate from her strategy. We consider a relaxation
of NE, the notion of an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE), where every player’s incentive
to deviate is at most ǫ > 0. We say that (Xi)i∈[n], which represents a mixed-strategy profile,
constitutes an ǫ-NE if for all i ∈ [n] and all j ∈ [k],
E[ui(X )] + ǫ ≥ E[uij(X−i)].
This definition, however, does not prohibit allocating a small amount of probability to arbitrar-
ily bad strategies. An ǫ-approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE) addresses this
issue by forcing every player to place a positive amount of probability solely on ǫ-approximate
best-responses, i.e., (Xi)i∈[n] constitutes an ǫ-WSNE if for all i ∈ [n], all j ∈ [k], and all
ℓ ∈ supp(E[Xi])1,
E[uiℓ(X−i)] + ǫ ≥ E[uij(X−i)].
Although an ǫ-WSNE is also an ǫ-NE, the converse need not be true.
Sub-classes of Anonymous Games Motivated by our first negative result, which states
that finding an exact NE in an anonymous game may require querying a number of payoffs
that is proportional to the size of the game, we consider further restrictions of the players’
utility function (from [5,15]) with the aim of getting more positive results for these.
An anonymous game is symmetric if for all i, ℓ ∈ [n], all j ∈ [k], and all x ∈ Πkn−1, then
uij(x) = u
ℓ
j(x), i.e., all players share the same utility function.
An anonymous game is self-anonymous if for all i ∈ [n], all j, ℓ ∈ [k], and all x ∈ {y ∈
Πkn−1 : yℓ 6= 0}, then uij(x) = uiℓ(x+ ej − eℓ), i.e., player i’s preferences depend on how all the
n players are partitioned into the k strategies; therefore, i does not distinguish herself from
the others.
An anonymous game is self-symmetric if it is both symmetric and self-anonymous.
An anonymous game is Lipschitz if every player’s utility function is Lipschitz continuous,
in the sense that for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [k], and all x, y ∈ Πkn−1,
∣∣∣uij(x)− uij(y)∣∣∣ ≤ λ ‖x− y‖1,
where λ ≥ 0 is the so-called Lipschitz constant and ‖ · ‖1 denotes the L1 norm.
1.3 Query-efficiency and Payoff Query Models.
Our general interest is in polynomial-time algorithms that find solutions of anonymous games,
while checking just a small fraction of the O(nk) payoffs of an n-player, k-strategy game. The
basic kind of query is a single-payoff query which receives as input a player i ∈ [n], a strategy
j ∈ [k], and a partition of n − 1 players into the k strategies x ∈ Πkn−1, and it returns the
corresponding payoff uij(x).
The query complexity of an algorithm is the expected number of single-payoff queries that
it needs in the worst case. Hence, an algorithm is query-efficient if its query complexity is
o(nk).
1 Given a vector v, supp(v) is used to denote the support of v, i.e., supp(v) = {i : vi > 0}.
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A profile query (used in [19]) consists of an action profile (a1, . . . , an) ∈ [k]n as input and
outputs the payoffs that every player i obtains according to that profile. Clearly, any profile
query can be simulated by a sequence of n single-payoff queries. Finally, an all-players query
consists of a pair (j, x) for j ∈ [k], x ∈ Πkn−1, and the response to (j, x) is the vector of all
players’ utilities (u1j (x), . . . , u
n
j (x)).
We consider the cost of a query to be equal to the number of payoffs it returns; hence,
a profile or an all-players query costs n single-payoff queries. We find that an algorithm
being constrained to utilize profile queries may incur a linear loss in query-efficiency (cf.
Section 2). Therefore, we focus on single-payoff and all-players queries, which better exploit
the symmetries of anonymous games.
1.4 Related Work
In the last decade, there has been interest in the complexity of computing approximate Nash
equilibria. A main reason is the PPAD-completeness results for computing an exact NE, for
normal-form games [6,10] (the latter paper extends the hardness also to fully polynomial-time
approximation schemes (FPTAS)), and recently also for anonymous games with 7 strategies
[7]. The FIXP-completeness results of [18] for multiplayer games show an algebraic obstacle
to the task of writing down a useful description of an exact equilibrium. On the other hand,
there exists a subexponential-time algorithm to find an ǫ-NE in normal-form games [25],
raising the well-known open question of the possible existence of a PTAS for these games.
Daskalakis and Papadimitriou proved that anonymous games admit a PTAS and provided
several improvements of its running time over the past few years. Their first algorithm [11]
concerns two-strategy games and is based upon the quantization of the strategy space into
nearby multiples of ǫ. This result was also extended to the multi-strategy case [12]. [9] subse-
quently gave an efficient PTAS whose running time is poly(n) · (1/ǫ)O(1/ǫ2), which relies on a
better understanding of the structure of ǫ-equilibria in two-strategy anonymous games: There
exists an ǫ-WSNE where either a small number of the players – at most O(1/ǫ3) – randomize
and the others play pure strategies, or whoever randomizes plays the same mixed strategy.
Furthermore, [13] proved a lower bound on the running time needed by any oblivious algo-
rithm, which lets the latter algorithm be essentially optimal. In the same article, they show
that the lower bound can be broken by utilizing a non-oblivious algorithm, which has the
currently best-known running time for finding an ǫ-equilibrium in two-strategy anonymous
games of O(poly(n) · (1/ǫ)O(log2(1/ǫ))). A complete proof is in [14]. It has been recently shown
that also k-strategy anonymous games admit an efficient PTAS [16,17].
In Section 6 we present a bound for λ-Lipschitz games, in which λ is a parameter limiting
the rate at which uij(x) changes as x changes. Any λ-Lipschitz k-strategy anonymous game
is guaranteed to have an ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, with ǫ = O(λk) [2, 15]. The
convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium of best-reply dynamics in the context of two-strategy
Lipschitz anonymous games is studied by [3, 24]. Moreover, [5] showed that finding a pure
equilibrium in anonymous games is easy if the number of strategies is constant w.r.t. the
number of players n, and hard as soon as there is a linear dependence.
In the last two years, several researchers obtained bounds for the query complexity for
approximate equilibria in different game settings, which we briefly survey. [19] presented the
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first series of results: they studied bimatrix games, graphical games, and congestion games on
graphs. Similar to our negative result for exact equilibria of anonymous games, it was shown
that a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game with k strategies per player requires k2 queries,
even in zero-sum games. However, more positive results arise if we move to ǫ-approximate
Nash equilibria. Approximate equilibria of bimatrix games were studied in more detail in [20].
The query complexity of equilibria of n-player games – a setting where payoff functions
are exponentially-large – was analyzed in [4, 8, 21, 22]. [22] showed that exponentially many
deterministic queries are required to find a 12 -approximate correlated equilibrium (CE) and
that any randomized algorithm that finds an exact CE needs 2Ω(n) expected cost. Notice that
lower bounds on correlated equilibria automatically apply to Nash equilibria. [21] investigated
in more detail the randomized query complexity of ǫ-CE and of the more demanding ǫ-well-
supported CE. [4] proved an exponential-in-n randomized lower bound for finding an ǫ-WSNE
in n-player, k-strategy games, for constant k = 104 and ǫ = 10−8. Finally, [8] showed (for
small enough positive ǫ) an exponential lower bound for ǫ-Nash equilibria of binary-action
games. These exponential lower bounds do not hold in anonymous games, which can be fully
revealed with a polynomial number of queries.
1.5 Our Results and their Significance
Query-efficiency serves as a criterion for distinguishing exact from approximate equilibrium
computation. It applies to games having exponentially-large representations [22], also for
games having poly-sized representations (e.g. bimatrix games [19, 20]). Here we extend this
finding to the important class of anonymous games.
We prove that even in two-strategy anonymous (and also self-anonymous) games, an exact
Nash equilibrium demands querying the payoff function exhaustively, even with the most
powerful query model (Theorem 3.1). Alongside this, we provide an example of a three-
player, two-strategy anonymous game whose unique Nash equilibrium needs all players to
randomize with an irrational amount of probability (Theorem 3.2), answering a question
posed in [15]. These results motivate our subsequent focus on sub-classes of anonymous game
and approximate equilibria.
Section 4 focuses on the search for pure exact equilibria, in subclasses of anonymous games
where these are guaranteed to exist. We give tight bounds for two-strategy symmetric games,
also k-strategy self-symmetric games, in the latter case via connecting them with the query
complexity of searching for a local optimum of a function on a grid graph, allowing us to
apply pre-existing results for that problem.
Section 5 is concerned with mixed-strategy equilibria of self-anonymous games. Although
searching for exact equilibria requires the utility function to be queried exhaustively, surpris-
ingly, a uniform randomization over all the strategies is always a O(n−1/2)-WSNE, for games
having a constant number of strategies. Therefore, no payoff needs to be queried for this.
Moreover, we give a reduction that maps any general two-strategy anonymous game G to a
two-strategy self-anonymous game G′ such that if an FPTAS for G′ exists, then there also
exists one for G. The possible existence of a FPTAS is the main open algorithmic question in
the context of anonymous games, thus we show that the search for an answer to this question
can focus on self-anonymous games (in the two-strategy case).
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In addition, we exhibit a simple query-efficient algorithm that finds an approximate pure
Nash equilibrium in two-strategy Lipschitz games (Algorithm 2; Theorem 6.1), which is sub-
sequently used by our main algorithm for anonymous games.
Our main result (Theorem 7.1) is a new randomized approximation scheme2 for two-
strategy anonymous games that differs conceptually from previous ones and offers new perfor-
mance guarantees. It is query-efficient (using o(n2) queries) and has improved computational
efficiency. It is the first PTAS for anonymous games that is polynomial in a setting where n
and 1/ǫ are polynomially related. In particular, its runtime is polynomial in n in a setting
where 1/ǫ may grow in proportion to n1/4 and also has an improved polynomial dependence
on n for all ǫ ≥ n−1/4. In more detail, for any ǫ ≥ n−1/4, the algorithm adaptively finds a
O (ǫ)-NE with O˜ (
√
n) (where we use O˜(·) to hide polylogarithmic factors) all-players queries
(i.e., O˜
(
n3/2
)
single payoffs) and runs in time O˜
(
n3/2
)
. The best-known algorithm of [15]
runs in time O(poly(n) · (1/ǫ)O(log2(1/ǫ))), where poly(n) ≥ O(n7).
In addition to this, we derive a randomized logarithmic lower bound on the number of
all-players queries needed to find any non-trivial ǫ-WSNE in two-strategy anonymous games
(Theorem 7.2).
2 Comparison of Query Models
We begin by comparing the profile query model with the other two in the context of anonymous
games. Recall that one profile or one all-players query costs n single-payoff queries due to
returning n payoffs. We use PR, AP, and SP to denote profile, all-players, and single-payoff
queries, respectively.
2.1 Simulating Profile Queries
A PR query can be simulated by a sequence of n SP queries by requesting for each player the
payoff associated with the strategy profile of the PR query.
A PR query can be simulated using at most k AP queries, as follows. Let a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈
[k]n be a given profile query. Let Nj ⊆ [n] be the players who play j in a. For all j ∈ [k]
such that Nj 6= ∅, we query the payoff for strategy j against the partition (|N1|, . . . , |Nj | −
1, . . . , |Nk|) ∈ Πkn−1. The cost, therefore, increases at most by a factor of k.
2.2 Simulating Single-payoff Queries
A sequence of SP queries can obviously be simulated by a sequence of PR or AP queries
having the same length. However, this approach increases the total cost by a factor of n since
we receive the payoffs of every player. In general, it cannot be simulated by a shorter sequence,
for example if every SP query is based on a different partition in Πkn−1.
2 To make Theorem 7.1 easier to read, we state it only for the best attainable approximation (i.e., n−1/4);
however, it is possible to set parameters to get any approximation ǫ ≥ n−1/4. For details, see the proof of
Theorem 7.1.
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2.3 Simulating All-players Queries
Clearly, any AP query can be simulated by n SP queries. We consider whether AP queries can
be efficiently simulated by PR queries, and argue that this is generally not the case. Clearly, n
profile queries suffice to obtain all the information returned by one AP query, and there exist
examples where this upper bound is required. In section 2.4, we present such an example.
However, there are also cases in which an all-player query can be simulated by a constant
number of profile queries. For instance, suppose we are dealing with a two-strategy anonymous
game, and let α ∈ (0, 1) be a constant. If an AP query retrieves the payoff for playing strategy
j ∈ {1, 2} when αn players (in total) are playing strategy j, then 1/α PR queries are enough
to get all the information. Consider the following sequence of PR queries when j = 1. The
case j = 2 is similar.
(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
αn
, 2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1−α)n
), (2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
αn
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
αn
, 2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1−2α)n
), . . . , (2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1−α)n
, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
αn
).
Clearly, every query lets αn players know their payoffs; therefore, 1/α PR queries suffice to
simulate an all-players query as specified above. The above simulation suggests that if an AP
query algorithm asks the payoffs for strategy j subject to the constraint that the fraction of
players using j is bounded away from 0, then it can be simulated by a PR query-algorithm
whose cost is only increased by a constant factor.
2.4 A Quadratic Cost Lower Bound in the Profile Model
We show that finding an ǫ-WSNE, for any ǫ < 1/2, in a two-strategy anonymous game may
require a linear number of profile queries, i.e., a cost of n2. Due to the fact that a two-strategy
anonymous game incorporates 2n2 payoffs, such a lower bound rules out the possibility of a
profile-query efficient algorithm for well-supported approximate equilibria.
Example 2.1. Let Dn be the following distribution over two-strategy n-player anonymous
games where every player’s payoff takes a value in {0, 12 , 1}. Let a player h ∈ [n] be chosen
uniformly at random. Let h’s and the other players’ (ℓ denotes a typical player different from
h) payoffs be defined as in Figure 1.
x 0 . . . n− 2 n− 1
uh1 (x)
1
2
. . . 1
2
1
2
uh2 (x) 0 . . . 0 1
(a) h’s payoff
x 0 . . . n− 2 n− 1
uℓ1(x)
1
2
. . . 1
2
1
2
uℓ2(x) 0 . . . 0 0
(b) Other players’ payoff
Fig. 1. Definition of Dn’s payoffs. x denotes the number of players who play strategy 1.
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Remark 2.1. Any randomized profile-query algorithm needs to make Ω(n) queries, which cost
Ω(n2) payoffs, to find an ǫ-WSNE of Dn, for any ǫ ∈ [0, 12).
Proof (Proof sketch). We use Yao’s minimax principle. Clearly, every ℓ is always better off
playing 1. As a result, the hidden player h should play 2. This is the unique exact NE and
ǫ-WSNE, for ǫ < 1/2. Evidently, a profile-query algorithm must identify h — the unique
player who plays 2 — by querying vectors of the form (1, . . . , 1, 2, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ {1, 2}n. If the 2
does not appear at h’s index, the query returns no useful information. Due to h being chosen
uniformly at random, a linear number of profile queries is required.
Remark 2.2. The all-players query (2, n − 1) ∈ {1, 2} × {0, . . . , n − 1} suffices to discover a
pure Nash equilibrium of a game coming from Dn.
3 Exact Nash Equilibria
We lower-bound the number of single-payoff queries (the least constrained query model)
needed to find an exact NE in an anonymous game. We exhibit games in which any al-
gorithm must query most of the payoffs in order to determine what strategies form a NE.
Difficult games are ones that only possess NE in which Ω(n) players must randomize.
Example 3.1. Let G be the following two-strategy, n-player anonymous game. Let n be even.
Half of the players have a utility function as shown by the top side (a) of Figure 2, and the
remaining half as at (b).
x 0 1 2 . . . n− 2 n− 1
ui1(x)
1
2
− ( 1
2
− 1
2n
)
1
2
− ( 1
2
− 3
2n
)
1
2
− ( 1
2
− 5
2n
)
. . . 1
2
+
(
1
2
− 3
2n
)
1
2
+
(
1
2
− 1
2n
)
ui2(x)
1
2
1
2
1
2
. . . 1
2
1
2
(a) Payoff table for “majority-seeking” player i
x 0 1 2 . . . n− 2 n− 1
ui1(x)
1
2
+
(
1
2
− 1
2n
)
1
2
+
(
1
2
− 3
2n
)
1
2
+
(
1
2
− 5
2n
)
. . . 1
2
− ( 1
2
− 3
2n
)
1
2
− ( 1
2
− 1
2n
)
ui2(x)
1
2
1
2
1
2
. . . 1
2
1
2
(b) Payoff table for “minority-seeking” player i
Fig. 2. Majority-minority game G’s payoffs. There are n
2
majority-seeking players and n
2
minority-seeking
players. x denotes the number of players other than i who play 1. The key feature of the payoff function is that
for a majority-seeking player, the advantage of playing 2 as opposed to 1 decreases linearly in x, and increases
linearly in x for a minority-seeking player.
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The proof of Theorem 3.1 shows that in any NE of G, at least n/2 players must use mixed
strategies. Consequently the distribution of the number of players using either strategy has
support ≥ n/2, so for a typical player it is necessary to check n/2 of his payoffs.
Theorem 3.1. A single-payoff query algorithm may need to query Ω(n2) payoffs in order
to find an exact Nash equilibrium of an n-player game, even for two-strategy self-anonymous
games.
Proof. We prove that in any exact equilibrium of G (Example 3.1), at least n/2 players must
use mixed strategies. G is not self-anonymous, but we can then invoke Theorem 5.2, which
reduces the problem of computing equilibria of anonymous games, to the computation of
equilibria of self-anonymous games.
We proceed by arguing that in any Nash equilibrium of G, at least n/2 players must use
mixed strategies. The result follows, since an equilibrium must then have support linear in
n, and for a player who mixes, it becomes necessary to check, via queries, his payoffs for all
these outcomes. We note in passing that G has an equilibrium in which all players mix with
equal probabilities 12 .
Consider a NE of G and let pi be the probability that player i plays 1, in that equilibrium.
Let P i1(s) denote the expected payoff of player i for playing strategy 1, minus the expected
payoff of i for playing 2, in the (possibly mixed) strategy profile s. If, in a pure profile, x other
players play strategy 1, then for a majority player i, P i1(s) = (
x
n − 12 + 12n). By linearity of
expectations, if in a mixed strategy s, x is the expected number of other players who play 1,
then P i1(s) = (
x
n − 12 + 12n). Consequently, the incentive for a majority player i′ to play 1 is∑
i 6=i′
pi
n − n−12n . Furthermore, the incentive for a minority player i′ to play 2 is
∑
i 6=i′
pi
n − n−12n .
Suppose a majority player i′ mixes with probability pi′ ∈ (0, 1). Notice that
∑
i 6=i′ pi =
n−1
2 .
The expected number of users of strategy 1 differs from the expected number of users of
strategy 2 by less than 1. This means that no majority player may use a pure strategy; if
he did, he would have an incentive to use the opposite strategy. It follows that all majority
players must use mixed strategies.
Suppose a minority player i′ who plays a mixed strategy uses pi′ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose, in
addition, all majority players play pure strategies. In that case, as before, any majority player
would want to switch. So in this case, all majority players must mix, as before.
Finally, suppose all players play pure strategies. If strategies 1 and 2 both have the same
number of users, then all majority players will want to switch. Alternatively, if, say, strategy
1 is used by more than n/2 players, it will be being used by a minority player who will want
to switch. Thus, all majority players must use mixed strategies.
This means that (for each majority player) at least n/2 payoffs need to be known for
the computation of expected utilities. If one of these payoffs is unknown, there remains the
possibility that it could take an alternative value that results in that player no longer being
indifferent between 1 and 2, and having an incentive to deviate.
3.1 A game whose solution must have irrational numbers
[15] note as an open problem, the question of whether there is a two-strategy anonymous
game whose Nash equilibria require players to mix with irrational probabilities. The following
9
example shows that such a game does indeed exist, even with just 3 players. In the context of
the present paper, it is a further motivation for our focus on approximate rather than exact
Nash equilibria.
Example 3.2. Consider the following anonymous game represented in normal form in Figure 3
and in its anonymous form in Figure 4. We show that in the unique equilibrium, the row, the
column, and the matrix players must randomize respectively with probabilities
pr =
1
12
(
√
241− 7), pc = 1
16
(
√
241 − 7), pm = 1
36
(23−
√
241).
1 2
1 (1, 0, 1) (1, 1
2
, 0)
2 (0, 0, 0) ( 1
2
, 1
4
, 0)
1
1 2
1 (1, 0, 0) (0, 1
4
, 1
2
)
2 ( 1
2
, 1, 1
2
) (1, 0, 1)
2
Fig. 3. The three-player two-strategy anonymous game in normal form. A payoff tuple (a, b, c) represents the
row, the column, and the matrix players’ payoff, respectively.
x 0 1 2
ur1(x) 0 1 1
ur2(x) 1
1
2
0
(a) r’s payoff table
x 0 1 2
uc1(x) 1 0 0
uc2(x) 0
1
4
1
2
(b) c’s payoff table
x 0 1 2
um1 (x) 0 0 1
um2 (x) 1
1
2
0
(c) m’s payoff table
Fig. 4. The three-player two-strategy anonymous game represented in the anonymous compact form, where x
denotes the number of other players playing strategy 1.
Theorem 3.2. There exists a three-player, two-strategy anonymous game that has a unique
Nash equilibrium where all the players must randomize with irrational probabilities.
Proof. We use the game in Example 3.2, which is represented in anonymous form in Figure 4.
It is easy to check that the game admits no pure Nash equilibrium. Let r, c,m denote the
row, column, and matrix player, respectively. Further, let pi denote the amount of probability
that i ∈ {r, c,m} allocates to strategy 1. Suppose, for the moment, that the game admits only
fully-mixed equilibria. Then, these can be found by solving the following system of equations,
which results from making everyone indifferent.

1
2 · (pc · (1− pm) + pm · (1− pc)) + pc · pm = (1− pm) · (1− pc)
(1− pr) · (1− pm) = 14 · (pr · (1− pm) + pm · (1− pr)) + 12 · pr · pm
pr · pc = (1− pr) · (1− pc) + 12 · (pr · (1− pc) + pc · (1− pr)),
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which reduces to

3
2 · (pc + pm)− pc · pm = 1
5
4 · (pr + pm)− pr · pm = 1
1
2 · (pr + pc) + pr · pc = 1,
and whose unique solution in the interval [0, 1] is
pr =
1
12
(
√
241− 7) ≈ 0.71, pc = 1
16
(
√
241 − 7) ≈ 0.53,
pm =
1
36
(23 −
√
241) ≈ 0.21.
Now we show that everybody must indeed randomize in order to be in equilibrium. Suppose
we fix player r to play 1. Given this, it is easy to see that both c and m must play 2, making r
unhappy and willing to move to strategy 2. If we fix r to play 2, then m plays 2 and c plays 1.
However, r would be better off deviating to strategy 1. Similar arguments can prove that we
cannot fix c to any of the two strategies nor m to play 1. The most interesting case is when
we fix m to play 2. Given this, we must set pr =
4
5 and pc =
2
3 in order for r and c to be in
equilibrium between each other. Player m’s expected payoff for playing 1 is 23 · 45 = 815 , which
is larger than what she gets for playing 2, i.e.,
(
1
3 · 15
)
+ 12 ·
(
4
15 +
2
15
)
= 415 . Hence, m cannot
play pure 2, and the game has a unique fully-mixed Nash equilibrium where all players must
randomize with irrational probabilities.
4 Pure equilibria of symmetric games
The query complexity lower bound of Section 3 led us to investigate whether we can find a
NE in the class of symmetric games, using fewer queries. We show that this is indeed the case
in the context of two-strategy symmetric games and k-strategy self-symmetric games, both
of which always possess pure Nash equilibria (PNE). Since in symmetric games every player
shares the same utility function, the following results are w.r.t. single-payoff queries.
Proposition 4.1. A Nash equilibrium of any 2-strategy n-player symmetric game can be
found with O(log n) single-payoff queries.
Proof. Algorithm 1 uses a binary search approach to find a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE).
We know that a PNE must exist, and we show that the algorithm correctly finds one. Note
that when the conditions are met for returning an output, we have found a PNE. We show
inductively that if a PNE is in the search space of the k-th round and not yet found, then
there is a PNE in the search space of round k + 1.
The base case is trivial since the search space is {0, . . . , n − 1}. Suppose that after k
recursive calls a PNE is still in the search space but not found yet. We need to show that
there is still a PNE in the search space of step k + 1. Let {αk, . . . , βk} be the search space
at step k. Let mk := ⌊αk+βk2 ⌋ as in the algorithm. Since mk does not lead to an equilibrium,
the algorithm makes a case distinction. Note that, by construction, u1(αk) ≥ u2(αk) and
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Algorithm 1: SymmetricPNE
Data: The number of players n.
Result: The number of players m playing strategy 1 in a PNE.
begin
return search(0, n− 1)
end
Procedure search(α, β)
m := ⌊α+β
2
⌋
if m = α ∨m = β then
return m
end
Use queries to identify: u1(m− 1), u2(m− 1), u1(m), u2(m)
if u1(m− 1) ≥ u2(m− 1) and u1(m) ≤ u2(m) then
return m
end
if u1(m− 1) < u2(m− 1) then
β := m
else
α := m
end
return search(α, β)
u1(βk − 1) < u2(βk − 1). In fact, in the case u1(mk − 1) < u2(mk − 1), we have that the
search space is {αk, . . . ,mk}. Due to the induction hypothesis, a PNE is located at an x ∈
{αk, . . . , βk}. Hence we only need to show that a PNE is located at an x ≤ mk−1. A PNE must
be there since otherwise it must always holds that u1(x) < u2(x) for all x ∈ {αk, . . . ,mk},
contradicting the fact that, by construction, u1(αk) ≥ u2(αk). The other case is symmetric.
If u1(mk) ≥ u2(mk), then the resulting search space is {mk, . . . , βk}. No PNE would require
having u1(x) ≥ u2(x) for all x ∈ {mk, . . . , βk}. We know, however, that u1(βk−1) < u2(βk−1),
which is a contradiction.
Finally, note that the number of recursive calls made by Algorithm 1 is Θ(log n), with
a constant number of queries per recursive call, giving us the claimed logarithmic query
complexity.
The following lower bound is given on the restricted class of self-symmetric games and
makes the above algorithm asymptotically optimal. We use u : Πkn −→ [0, 1] to denote the
utility function of any player i due to its independence from i.
Proposition 4.2. Any algorithm that finds a pure Nash equilibrium in a two-strategy, n-
player self-symmetric game needs to make Ω(log n) single-payoff queries in the worst case.
Proof. A two-strategy game that is both symmetric and self-anonymous is defined in terms
of a utility function u : {0, . . . , n} → [0, 1] mapping the number of players who use strategy
1, to a single payoff that all players receive. A pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) corresponds to
a local optimum of u.
We restrict ourselves to functions u having a unique local optimum OPTu; thus u(x)
increases monotonically and then decreases monotonically as x increases. Assume also that
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u(0) = u(n) = 0. We consider an adversary who answers queries so as to achieve the following
objective. At any point, there is a range that is known to contain OPTu; each answer to a
query should reduce that range by a factor of at most 2.
This is achieved as follows. Let {x1, . . . , x2} be the solution range, and xq be a query point.
If x1 < xq < x2, then output a payoff that is slightly higher than previously-observed payoffs,
and let the new solution range be the larger of {x1, . . . , xq} and {xq, . . . , x2}. If xq ≤ x1 or
xq ≥ x2, choose a payoff that interpolates between the closest known values to xq.
With this approach, the adversary can ensure Ω(log(n)) queries need to be made, as
claimed.
Moving to k-strategy self-symmetric games, these are a special case of pure coordination
games where every pure-strategy profile yields the same utility to all players [5]. So, once
again such a game possesses a pure Nash equilibrium corresponding to a local maximum of
the utility function u. The following results identify the deterministic and randomized payoff
query complexity of finding a PNE in k-strategy self-symmetric games, for any constant k.
This is done by relating it to the problem of finding a local optimum of a real-valued function
f on a regular grid graph (Lemma 4.1), about which much is known, and then applying those
pre-existing results. Of interest to us is the d-dimensional regular grid graph; [n]d denotes the
graph on [n]× . . .× [n], where edges are only present between two vertices that differ by 1 in
a single coordinate, and other coordinates are equal.
Lemma 4.1. For any constant k, the query complexity of searching for a pure Nash equi-
librium of k-strategy n-player self-symmetric games, is within a constant factor of the query
complexity of searching for a local optimum of the grid graph [n]k−1.
Proof. Given a self-symmetric game G, let G(G) be the graph of pure-strategy profiles of
G, whose edges are single-player deviations. We seek a vertex of G(G) which forms a local
optimum of u.
We start by reducing the problem of searching for an optimum of a function f of the
vertices of [n]k−1 to the search for a PNE of a k-strategy self-symmetric game G. First,
extend f to the domain ({0} ∪ [n])k−1 in such a way that no local optimum of f occurs at a
point with a zero coordinate. Assume that the codomain of f is [0, 1]. Construct G with kn
players and k strategies as follows. Let s = (x1, . . . , xk) be a typical anonymous pure profile of
G, where xj denotes the number of players who play strategy j. If 0 ≤ xj ≤ n for each j < k,
set u(s) equal to f(p), where p is the corresponding point in [n]k−1. For the remaining profiles
(the red area of Figure 5, depicting the case k = 2), we assign them negative utilities in such
a way that none of them are local optima of u. Consequently, any PNE of G corresponds to a
local optimum of f , so the query complexity of G is at least the query complexity of finding
a local optimum of f . Note that the description size of G is larger than that of f by just a
linear factor (the value of the k-th entry of a pure profile of G is determined by the previous
k − 1 entries).
Next we reduce the query-based search for a PNE of a n-player k-strategy G to the problem
of locally optimizing a function f on a k-dimensional grid graph. We use the graph [n]k−1
where the first k − 1 coordinates of a profile in G are mapped to the corresponding vertex of
[n]k−1, and f maps the remaining vertices of [n]k−1 to negative values in such a way that none
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(0, 0) (2n, 0)
(0, 2n)
(0, n) (n, n)
(n, 0)
Fig. 5. The graph when k = 3. The yellow area shows the embedded grid. The irrelevant points for the local
maxima computation are in red.
of them are solutions. Reducing in this direction, we have to deal with non-grid edges of G(G)
whose presence may cause some profile not to be a PNE (the diagonal edges in Figure 5). Such
edges correspond to a player switching from a strategy in {1, . . . , k − 1} to another strategy
in {1, . . . , k − 1} (as opposed to switching to/from strategy k, which correspond to the grid
edges). We deal with this by designing the function f in terms of u such that each query of
the game is simulated by a constant number of queries of the grid [n]k−1. If a vertex v of
G(G) belongs to one or more triangles {v, v′, v′′} for which {v′, v′′} is a non-grid edge, then
if u(v) < u(v′) and u(v) < u(v′′), f(v) is set equal to (u(v′) + u(v′′))/2, and if v belongs to
multiple such triangles, the largest such value is used. Otherwise, f is set equal to u.
This construction of f from u gets rid of local optima that may arise from deleting the
diagonal edges (for the purpose of embedding in [n]k−1), and remaining local optima of f
correspond to local optima of u. For constant k, a query to f can be computed by a constant
number of queries to u, so the query complexities (as functions of n) are linearly related.
Corollary 4.1. The randomized query complexity of searching for PNE of self-symmetric
games is Θ(n(k−1)/2) for constant k ≥ 5.
Proof. We use Lemma 4.1 and a result of [26] that the randomized query complexity of
optimizing a function on the grid [n]d is Θ(nd/2) for d ≥ 4. The statement follows from the
fact that we have d = k − 1.
Corollary 4.2. The deterministic query complexity of searching for PNE of self-symmetric
games is Θ(nk−2) for constant k > 2.
Proof. We use Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 3 of [1], which identifies upper and lower bounds for
the query complexity of deterministically optimizing a function on the grid [n]d that are both
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proportional to nd−1. Again, the statement follows from having d = k − 1. (We note that
in [1], the roles of n and k are reversed relative to here.)
5 Self-anonymous Games
We show that in self-anonymous games, if every player uses the uniform distribution over her
actions, this mixed profile constitutes a O (1/
√
n)-WSNE. This means that no query is needed
to find any such approximation. We provide an inductive proof on the constant number of
actions k. First, we demonstrate that this holds for two-strategy games and subsequently
utilize this result as the base case of the induction. We prove the following lemma below
although, in fact, it also follows from the combination of Lemma 7.1 and Lemma 7.5 with
ǫ = 1/2.
Lemma 5.1. In any two-strategy n-player self-anonymous game, the mixed-strategy profile
s = (12 , . . . ,
1
2) is an O (1/
√
n)-WSNE.
Proof. We will show that for any player i ∈ [n], we have∣∣∣E[ui1(X−i)]− E[ui2(X−i)]∣∣∣ ≤ eπ · 1√n− 1 . (1)
To prove (1), we analyse the expected value to player 1 of strategy 1 minus that of strategy
2 as follows:
n−1∑
x=0
(ui1(x)− ui2(x)) · Pr[X−i = x]
=
n−2∑
x=0
(ui2(x+ 1)− ui2(x)) · Pr[X−i = x] + (ui1(n− 1)− ui2(n− 1)) · Pr[X−i = n− 1]
=
n−2∑
x=0
(ui2(x+ 1)− ui2(x)) ·
(
n− 1
x
)
· 1
2n−1
+ (ui1(n− 1)− ui2(n− 1)) ·
1
2n−1
=
1
2n−1
(
n−1∑
x=1
ui2(x) ·
((
n− 1
x− 1
)
−
(
n− 1
x
))
+ (ui1(n− 1)− ui2(0))
)
,
where in the second step we applied the self-anonymity property, in the third step we used the
definition of the p.m.f. of the binomial distribution, and in the fourth one we simply rearranged
terms. Since the utility function outputs values in [0, 1], then ui1(n−1)−ui2(0) ≤ 1. Moreover,
for all x = 1, . . . , n−12 , we have
(n−1
x−1
) − (n−1x ) < 0, and strictly positive for the remaining
values. Thus, in the worst case we have
ui2(x) =

0 if x ∈ {1, . . . ,
n−1
2 }
1 if x ∈ {n−12 + 1, . . . , n− 1},
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reducing the above expression to be at most
1
2n−1

 n−1∑
x=n−1
2
+1
((
n− 1
x− 1
)
−
(
n− 1
x
))
+ 1


=
1
2n−1

 n−1∑
x=n−1
2
+1
(
n− 1
x− 1
)
−
n−2∑
x=n−1
2
+1
(
n− 1
x
)
=
1
2n−1

 n−2∑
x=n−1
2
(
n− 1
x
)
−
n−2∑
x=n−1
2
+1
(
n− 1
x
) = 1
2n−1
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
=
1
2n−1
· (n− 1)!((
n−1
2
)
!
)2 .
By Stirling’s bounds, we know that
√
2π · nn+1/2 · e−n ≤ n! ≤ e · nn+1/2 · e−n. Hence,
1
2n−1
· (n− 1)!((
n−1
2
)
!
)2 ≤ 12n−1 · e · (n− 1)
n−1+ 1
2 · e−(n−1)(√
2π · (n−12 )
n−1+1
2 · e−(n−12 )
)2
=
1
2n−1
· e · (n− 1)
n− 1
2 · e−(n−1)
2π · (n−12 )n · e−(n−1)
=
e
π
· 1√
n− 1 .
This gives the required upper bounded on the value of strategy 1 minus that of strategy 2.
The value of strategy 2 minus that of strategy 1 has the same analysis and upper bound,
which gives us (1).
Theorem 5.1. For constant k, in any k-strategy n-player self-anonymous game letting every
player randomize uniformly is a O (1/
√
n)-WSNE.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of strategies k where the base case k =
2 follows by Lemma 5.1. Suppose that it holds that in any (k − 1)-strategy n-player self-
anonymous game, every player i ∈ [n] mixing uniformly is a O (1/√n)-WSNE. We show that
this holds also for k strategies.
Let Gk be a k-strategy self-anonymous game. Moreover, let X
(ℓ)
i be a random variable
indicating whether player i plays strategy ℓ. Let X
(k)
−i :=
∑
j 6=iX
(k)
j denote the number of
players other than i playing strategy k in Gk. We observe that E
[
X
(k)
−i
]
= n−1k , so by Chernoff
bounds, we have that
Pr
[
X
(k)
−i ≥
2
k
(n− 1)
]
≤ e−n−13k2 , (2)
thus, exponentially small in n for constant k. We bound the difference in player i’s utility
between two strategies, say, 1 and 2, which is∑
x1,...,xk:
x1+...+xk=n
(ui1(x1, . . . , xk)− ui2(x1, . . . , xk)) · Pr
[
X
(1)
−i = x1, . . . ,X
(k)
−i = xk
]
,
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where the utility function uij takes as input the number xm of players playing strategy m, for
all m = 1, . . . , k.
Next we decompose this into the contributions to the expected difference between i’s utility
for 1 and 2, arising from the event that xk players play strategy k:
n∑
xk=0
Pr
[
X
(k)
−i = xk
] ∑
x1,...,xk−1:
x1+...+xk−1=n−xk
(ui1(x2, . . . , xk)− ui2(x2, . . . , xk)) · Pr
[
X
(2)
−i = x2, . . . ,X
(k−1)
−i = xk−1
∣∣X(k)−i = xk] .
Observe that when we sum over x2, . . . , xk−1 but not xk, we are dealing with an (n − xk)-
player (k − 1)-strategy game Gk−1 where all (n− xk) players are still randomizing uniformly
among the k−1 strategies. To see this, we could think of fixing the identities of the xk players
playing strategy k to be {n − xk + 1, . . . , n} but Gk−1 is anonymous, i.e., invariant under
permutations of the players. By induction hypothesis, we can bound the difference in payoff
in Gk−1 by O
(
1√
n−xk
)
. We can, therefore, write the difference in utilities between 1 and 2 as
n−1∑
xk=0
Pr
[
X
(k)
−i = xk
]
· O
(
1√
n− xk
)
≤
2
k
(n−1)∑
xk=0
Pr
[
X
(k)
−i = xk
]
· O
(
1√
n− 2/k
)
+
n−1∑
xk=
2
k
(n−1)+1
e−
n−1
3k2 · 1
≤ O
(√
k
kn− 2
)
+
k − 2
k
n · e−n−13k2 = O
(
1√
n
)
.
where the first inequality used Equation (2). We should perhaps note that in summing
over big-oh expressions, the hidden constant in the notation is the same for all terms in the
summation (namely, one that applies for k − 1 strategy games, which exists by inductive
hypothesis). As long as k is a constant, we have the above claimed upper bound. In addition,
notice that if k is not a constant, the result no longer holds since the proof adds a constant
factor of k! into the big-oh notation.
Corollary 5.1. For any constant k, no payoff queries are needed to find a O(1/
√
n)-approximate
equilibrium in k-strategy n-player self-anonymous games.
The following Theorem 5.2 extends an idea of Lemma 1 of [5], which reduces the com-
putation of an exact equilibrium of a two-strategy anonymous game to a two-strategy self-
anonymous game. Theorem 5.2 goes further, showing that to some extent approximations can
be preserved. We apply it to prove Corollary 5.4, that the problem of finding an FPTAS in
two-strategy anonymous games reduces to finding an FPTAS in two-strategy self-anonymous
games. Below, we also discuss why Theorem 5.2 does not extend straightforwardly to more
than two strategies.
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Theorem 5.2. Let G := (n, 2, {uij}i∈[n],j∈[2]) be a two-strategy anonymous game, and let
G¯ := (n, 2, {u¯ij}i∈[n],j∈[2]) be the following self-anonymous game. u¯i2(x + 1) is set equal to
u¯i1(x) for all x, as required for G¯ to be self-anonymous. Then,
u¯i2(0) =
1
2
,
u¯i1(x) = u¯
i
2(x) +
ui1(x)− ui2(x)
2n
for all x ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1},
A mixed strategy profile s = (p1, . . . , pn) is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in G if and
only if it is an ǫ2n -approximate Nash equilibrium in G¯.
Proof. First of all, we remark that dividing by 2n ensures having all the payoffs in [0, 1]. Let
Xj denote a Bernoulli random variable indicating whether player j plays strategy 1, whose
expectation is E[Xj ] := pj for all j ∈ [n], and let X−i :=
∑
j 6=iXj .
=⇒: We now show that if a strategy profile s = (p1, . . . , pn) is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilib-
rium in G, then it is an ǫ2n -approximate Nash equilibrium in G¯. Assume for contradiction
that s is not an ǫ2n -approximate Nash equilibrium in G¯. Hence, there must be some player
i ∈ [n] that gains strictly more than ǫ2n by deviating to either strategy 1 or 2, i.e.,
∃i ∈ [n] : pi · E[u¯i1(X−i)] + (1− pi) · E[u¯i2(X−i)] +
ǫ
2n
< E[u¯iℓ(X−i)],
for some ℓ ∈ [2]. We make a case distinction on ℓ.
Case ℓ = 1: We have that
(1− pi) · E[u¯i2(X−i)] +
ǫ
2n
< (1− pi) · E[u¯i1(X−i)],
which by definition is equivalent to
(1− pi) ·
n−1∑
x=0
u¯i2(x) · Pr[X−i = x] +
ǫ
2n
< (1− pi) ·
n−1∑
x=0
u¯i1(x) · Pr[X−i = x].
If we apply our payoff transformation rule on the RHS, we have
(1− pi) ·
n−1∑
x=0
u¯i2(x) · Pr[X−i = x] +
ǫ
2n
<
(1− pi) ·
n−1∑
x=0
(
u¯i2(x) +
ui1(x)− ui2(x)
2n
)
· Pr[X−i = x],
which reduces to
(1− pi) ·
n−1∑
x=0
ui2(x) · Pr[X−i = x] + ǫ < (1− pi) ·
n−1∑
x=0
ui1(x) · Pr[X−i = x].
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Applying the definition of expected utility we have
(1− pi) · E[ui2(X−i)] + ǫ < (1− pi) · E[ui1(X−i)].
Therefore, we contradict the fact that s is an ǫ-equilibrium for G since i prefers devi-
ating to strategy 1 also in G.
Case ℓ = 2: We have that
pi · E[u¯i1(X−i)] +
ǫ
2n
< pi · E[u¯i2(X−i)],
and, by applying the same arguments, we have
pi · E[ui1(X−i)] + ǫ < pi · E[ui2(X−i)].
Therefore, we contradict the fact that s is an ǫ-equilibrium for G since i prefers devi-
ating to strategy 2 also in G.
⇐=: We now show that the converse is also true. The proof is very similar to the previous
one. We assume for contradiction that s is not an ǫ-equilibrium in G. Then,
∃i ∈ [n] : pi · E[ui1(X−i)] + (1− pi) · E[ui2(X−i)] + ǫ < E[uiℓ(X−i)],
for some ℓ ∈ [2]. We make, again, a case distinction on ℓ.
Case ℓ = 1: We have that
(1− pi) · E[ui2(X−i)] + ǫ < (1− pi) · E[ui1(X−i)],
which by definition is equivalent to
(1− pi) ·
n−1∑
x=0
(ui1(x)− ui2(x)) · Pr[X−i = x] > ǫ.
If we apply our transformation ui1(x)− ui2(x) = 2n · (u¯i1(x)− u¯i2(x)), we have that
(1− pi) ·
n−1∑
x=0
(u¯i1(x)− u¯i2(x)) · Pr[X−i = x] >
ǫ
2n
,
which means
(1− pi) · E[u¯i1(X−i)] +
ǫ
2n
< (1− pi) · E[u¯i2(X−i)],
contradicting the assumption that s is an ǫ2n -equilibrium in G¯.
Case ℓ = 2: Similarly, we have that
pi · E[ui1(X−i)] + ǫ < pi · E[ui2(X−i)],
which, as in the above case, reduces to having
pi · E[u¯i1(X−i)] +
ǫ
2n
< pi · E[u¯i2(X−i)],
contradicting the assumption that s is an ǫ2n -equilibrium in G¯.
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Corollary 5.2. Let G, G¯ be defined as above. A strategy profile s = (p1, . . . , pn) is a Nash
equilibrium in G if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium in G¯.
Proof. Use Theorem 5.2 with ǫ = 0.
Corollary 5.3. Finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-strategy anonymous game is as hard as
finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-strategy self-anonymous game.
Proof. Given any two-strategy anonymous game G, we can certainly construct G¯ in time that
is linear in the size of G, i.e., O(n2). By Corollary 5.2, the two games have the same set of
equilibria.
Corollary 5.4. If there is an FPTAS for two-strategy self-anonymous games, then there is
also an FPTAS for two-strategy anonymous games.
Proof. Pick any two-strategy anonymous game G, construct G¯ and find a δ-equilibrium for
δ = ǫ2n . Since there is an FPTAS, we have a running time that is poly(n, 1/δ). For δ =
ǫ
2n ,
the running time clearly is poly(n, 1/ǫ). Theorem 5.2 implies that a δ-equilibrium in G¯ is an
ǫ-equilibrium in G.
We end this section with a brief discussion of why Theorem 5.2 (and hence Corollar-
ies 5.2,5.3,5.4) does not extend straightforwardly to more than two strategies. In the context
of 3-strategy games, let uij(x, y, z) denote player i’s utility when amongst the n − 1 remain-
ing players, x play 1, y play 2, and z play 3. If there were, say, 16 players, note that to be
self-anonymous, the corresponding game G¯ would need to satisfy
u¯i1(4, 6, 5) = u¯
i
2(5, 5, 5) = u¯
i
3(5, 6, 4)
u¯i1(5, 5, 5) = u¯
i
2(6, 4, 5) = u¯
i
3(6, 5, 4)
u¯i1(5, 6, 4) = u¯
i
2(6, 5, 4) = u¯
i
3(6, 6, 3).
The proof of Theorem 5.2 envisages that u¯i1(5, 6, 4)− u¯i3(5, 6, 4) should be a rescaled version of
ui1(5, 6, 4)−ui3(5, 6, 4), and similarly for u¯i1(5, 5, 5)−u¯i2(5, 5, 5) and u¯i2(6, 5, 4)−u¯i3(6, 5, 4). That
is, the pairwise differences between the three values given by the above displayed formulae, are
required to be proportionate to pairwise differences between three pairs of payoffs in G, which
themselves may take any values in [0, 1]. Hence we get a conflict between the constraints that
result from a natural approach to generalising the result. It may be that (for k > 2) there
exists a more complicated reduction from an FPTAS for k-strategy games to an FPTAS for
k-strategy self-anonymous games, perhaps by increasing the number of players.
6 Two-strategy Lipschitz Games
Lipschitz games are anonymous games where every player’s utility function is Lipschitz-
continuous, in the sense that for all i ∈ [n], all j ∈ [k], and all x, y ∈ Πkn−1, it holds that∣∣∣uij(x)− uij(y)∣∣∣ ≤ λ ‖x− y‖1, where λ ≥ 0 is the Lipschitz constant.
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For games satisfying a Lipschitz condition with a small value of λ, e.g. inverse polynomial
in n, we obtain positive results for approximation and query complexity. In the special case
of games with two strategies per player, we show how a solution can be efficiently found via
a binary search on {0, . . . , n − 1}. However, this binary-search approach cannot be used for
k-strategy games with k > 2.
The following algorithms exploit our knowledge of the existence of pure approximate equi-
libria in Lipschitz games [2,15]. Algorithm 2 is subsequently used in Section 7 as a subroutine
of an algorithm for general (not necessarily Lipschitz) anonymous games. For notational con-
venience with regard to this subsequent result, in Algorithm 2 and Theorem 6.1 we use G¯ to
denote the input game rather than G.
Definition 6.1. Let (j, x) ∈ {1, 2} × {0, . . . , n− 1} be the input for an all-players query. For
δ ≥ 0, a δ-accurate all-players query returns a tuple of values (f1j (x), . . . , fnj (x)) such that
for all i ∈ [n], |uij(x) − f ij(x)| ≤ δ, i.e., they are within an additive δ of the correct payoffs
(u1j(x), . . . , u
n
j (x)).
Algorithm 2: Approximate NE Lipschitz
Data: δ-accurate query access to utility function u¯ of n-player λ-Lipschitz game G¯.
Result: pure-strategy 3(δ + λ)-NE of G¯.
begin
Let BR1(i) be the number of players whose best response (as derived from the δ-accurate queries)
is 1 when i of the other players play 1 and n− 1− i of the other players play 2.
Define φ(i) = BR1(i)− i. // by construction, φ(0) ≥ 0
// and φ(n− 1) ≤ 0
If BR1(0) = 0, return all-1’s profile.
If BR1(n− 1) = n, return all-2’s profile.
Otherwise, // In this case, φ(0) > 0 and φ(n− 1) ≤ 0
Find, via binary search, x such that φ(x) > 0 and φ(x+ 1) ≤ 0.
Construct pure profile p¯ as follows:
For each player i, if u¯i1(x)− u¯i2(x) > 2δ, let i play 1, and if u¯i2(x)− u¯i1(x) > 2δ, let i play 2. (The
u¯ij ’s are δ-accurate.) Remaining players are allocated either 1 or 2, subject to the constraint that x
or x+ 1 players in total play 1.
return p¯.
end
Theorem 6.1. Let G¯ =
(
n, 2, {u¯ij}i∈[n],j∈{1,2}
)
be an n-player, two-strategy λ-Lipschitz anony-
mous game. Algorithm 2 finds a pure-strategy 3(λ + δ)-WSNE using 4 log n δ-accurate all-
players payoff queries.
Proof. Consider the function φ : {0, . . . , n − 1} −→ {−n, . . . , n} defined in Algorithm 2. It
can be readily checked that if BR1(0) = 0 or BR1(n − 1) = n, then the solutions returned
are correct. Alternatively, the algorithm has to find x such that φ(x) > 0 and φ(x+1) ≤ 0, in
the case when φ(0) > 0 and φ(n− 1) ≤ 0, and it is clear that log n evaluations of φ suffice to
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find x. Moreover, notice that a candidate x can be checked using the following 4 all-players
queries: (1, x), (2, x), (1, x + 1), (2, x + 1). Hence, we need in total 4 log n queries to find x.
The main task is to prove that given x satisfying these conditions, a pure profile p¯ can
indeed be constructed in the way described, and that p¯ is indeed an approximate equilibrium.
Suppose for a contradiction that p¯ could not be constructed in the way described. For
example, suppose that more than x + 1 players are required to play 1 due to satisfying
u¯i1(x) − u¯i2(x) > 2δ. We argue that this would contradict that φ(x + 1) ≤ 0. The fact that
φ(x + 1) ≤ 0 means that there are n − (x + 1) players whose payoffs to play 2 (when x + 1
others play 1) are at most 2δ less than their payoffs to play 1 (when x+1 others play 1). When
these players play 2, they are 2δ-best-responding if x+1 players play 1, and by the Lipschitz
condition are 2(λ+ δ)-best-responding if x players play 1. So there is in fact a solution with
only x+1 players playing 1. A similar argument rules out the possibility that too many players
are required to play 2.
The fact that p¯ is a 3(λ+δ)-approximate equilibrium follows from the constraints imposed
on which pure strategy is allocated to each player.
7 General Two-strategy Anonymous Games
First, we present our main result (Theorem 7.1). Afterwards, we prove a lower bound on the
number of queries that any randomized algorithm needs to make to find any ǫ-WSNE.
7.1 Upper Bound
Before going into technical lemmas, we provide an informal overview of the algorithmic ap-
proach. Suppose we are to solve an n-player game G. The first idea is to “smooth” every
player’s utility function, so that it becomes λ-Lipschitz continuous for some λ. We smooth
a utility function by requiring every player to use some amount of randomness. Specifically,
for some small ζ we make every player place probability either ζ or 1 − ζ onto strategy 1.
Consequently, the expected payoff for player i is obtained by averaging her payoff values w.r.t.
a sum of two binomial distributions, consisting of a discrete bell-shaped distribution whose
standard deviation is at least ζ
√
n.
We construct the smooth game G¯ in the following manner. The payoff received in G¯ by
player i when x other players are playing strategy 1 is given by the expected payoff received
in G by player i when x other players play 1 with probability 1− ζ and n−1−x other players
play 1 with probability ζ. This creates a λ-Lipschitz game G¯ with λ = O (1/ζ
√
n).
Due to dealing with a two-strategy Lipschitz game, we can use the bisection method of
Algorithm 2. If we were allowed to query G¯ directly, a logarithmic number of all-players
queries would suffice. Unfortunately, this is not the case; thus, we need to simulate a query
to G¯ with a small number of queries to the original game G. Those queries are randomly
sampled from the mixed anonymous profile above, and we take enough samples to ensure we
get good estimates of the payoffs in G¯ with sufficiently high probability.
Thus, we are able to find an approximate pure Nash equilibrium of G¯ with O˜(
√
n) all-
players queries. This equilibrium is mapped back to G by letting the players who play strategy
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1 in G¯, play it with probability 1− ζ in G, and the ones who play strategy 2 in G¯ place proba-
bility ζ on strategy 1 in G. The quality of the approximation is proportional to
(
ζ + (ζ
√
n)−1
)
.
Before presenting our main algorithm (Algorithm 3) and proving its efficiency (Theo-
rem 7.1), we state the following lemmas that are used in the proof.
Lemma 7.1 ( [15]). Let X,Y be two random variables over {0, . . . , n} such that ‖X − Y ‖TV ≤
δ (where ‖X − Y ‖TV denotes the total variation distance between X and Y , i.e., 1/2·
∑n
x=0 |Pr[X = x]− Pr[Y = x]|).
Let f : {0, . . . , n} −→ [0, 1]. Then,
n∑
x=0
f(x) · (Pr[X = x]− Pr[Y = x]) ≤ 2δ.
Lemma 7.2 (Simulation of a query to G¯ (Algorithm 3)). Let δ, τ > 0. Let X be the sum
of n−1 Bernoulli random variables representing a mixed profile of n−1 players in an n-player
game G. Suppose we want to estimate, with additive error δ, the expected payoffs E[uij (X)]
for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ {1, 2}. This can be done with probability ≥ 1− τ using (1/2δ2) · log (4n/τ)
all-players queries.
Proof. Suppose we draw a set of N random samples {Z1, . . . , ZN} from the probability dis-
tribution of X (which can be done by computing each Zi as a sum of 0/1 outcomes of n− 1
biased coin flips. For each Zℓ and each j ∈ {1, 2} we can make an all-players query that tells
us, for every player, that payoff obtained by that player for playing j when Zi other players
play 1. So, a total of 2N queries are made.
Let Uˆ ij := 1/N ·
∑N
ℓ=1 u
i
j(Zℓ) denote our estimate of E[u
i
j(X)]. Then E
[
Uˆ ij
]
= E[uij (X)].
We can now use Hoeffding’s inequality to get that
Pr
[∣∣∣Uˆ ij − E [uij (X)]∣∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ 2exp (−2δ2N) .
Since there are 2n quantities we desire to estimate (2 strategies per player) within additive
error δ, we require a failure probability of at most τ/2n, so that with a union bound we get
that the estimates have additive error ≤ δ with probability at least 1− τ . Thus, we need that
2exp
(−2δ2N) ≤ τ/2n, which is satisfied for N ≥ (1/2δ2) · log(4n/τ).
Lemma 7.3. Let Y be a binomial random variable, Y ∼ B(n, p) for p ∈ [ζ, 1 − ζ], where
0 < ζ < 12 . Then, the probability value at Y ’s mode is at most
e
2πζ
√
n
(
1 + 1ζn
)
, i.e., O
(
1
ζ
√
n
)
.
Proof. The mode of Y is either ⌊np⌋ or ⌊np⌋+1. We bound the ratio Pr[Y = ⌊np⌋+1]/Pr[Y =
⌊np⌋], then we apply Stirling’s bound on the value Pr[Y = ⌊np⌋]. We bound the ratio as follows,
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where we use {a} to denote the fractional part of a.( n
⌊np⌋+1
) · p⌊np⌋+1 · (1− p)n−⌊np⌋−1( n
⌊np⌋
) · p⌊np⌋ · (1− p)n−⌊np⌋ = p1− p · ⌊np⌋! · (n− ⌊np⌋)!(⌊np⌋+ 1)! · (n− ⌊np⌋ − 1)!
=
p
1− p ·
n− ⌊np⌋
⌊np⌋+ 1
=
p
1− p ·
n− np+ {np}
⌊np⌋+ 1
=
p
1− p ·
(
(1− p)n
⌊np⌋+ 1 +
{np}
⌊np⌋+ 1
)
≤ np
np
+
p · {np}
(1− p) · np
< 1 +
1
ζn
.
In the second to last step we used the fact that ⌊np⌋+ 1 ≥ np. In the last one we used both
{np} < 1 and 1− p ≥ ζ. Next we bound the value at x = ⌊np⌋ using Stirling’s bounds.
Pr[Y = x] =
(
n
x
)
· px · (1− p)n−x
≤ e · n
n+1/2 · e−n · px · (1− p)n−x√
2π · xx+1/2 · e−x · √2π · (n− x)n−x+1/2 · e−(n−x)
=
e
2π
· n
n+1/2 · px · (1− p)n−x
(⌊np⌋)x+1/2 · (n − ⌊np⌋)n−x+1/2
=
e
2π
· n
n+1/2 · p⌊np⌋ · (1− p)n−⌊np⌋
n⌊np⌋+1/2 · nn−⌊np⌋+1/2 · p⌊np⌋+1/2 · (1− p)n−⌊np⌋+1/2
=
e
2π
· 1√
p(1− p) · √n
≤ e
2π
· 1
ζ
√
n
= O
(
1
ζ
√
n
)
.
If we combine Pr[Y = m]/Pr[Y = x] < 1 + 1ζn with Pr[Y = x] ≤ e2π · 1ζ√n , it follows that
Pr[Y = m] ≤ e
2πζ
√
n
(1 + 1ζn) = O(
1
ζ
√
n
), concluding the proof.
Lemma 7.4. Let Z :=
∑n
i=1 Zi be the sum of n independent 0-1 random variables such that
for some 0 < ζ ≤ 1/2, E[Zi] ∈ {ζ, 1 − ζ} for all i ∈ [n]. Then, the probability value at Z’s
mode is O
(
1
ζ
√
n
)
.
Proof. Z = X+Y for binomial random variables X,Y with X ∼ B(nX , ζ) and Y ∼ B(nY , 1−
ζ), where nX + nY = n. Z’s probability mass function can be written as
Pr[Z = i] =
nX∑
x=0
Pr[Z = i|X = x] · Pr[X = x] =
nX∑
x=0
Pr[X = x] · Pr[Y = i− x].
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Since nX + nY = n, we have max{nX , nY } ≥ n/2 = Ω(n). Assume nX be the maximum.
Then, by Lemma 7.3, Pr[X = x] ≤ O( 1ζ√nX ) for all x = 0, . . . , nX . Hence,
Pr[Z = i] ≤
nX∑
x=0
O
(
1
ζ
√
nX
)
· Pr[Y = i− x]
= O
(
1
ζ
√
nX
)
·
nX∑
x=0
Pr[Y = i− x]
≤ O
(
1
ζ
√
nX
)
= O
(
1
ζ
√
n
)
.
Lemma 7.5. Let X(j,n) :=
∑
i∈[n]Xi denote the sum of n independent 0/1 random variables
where E[Xi] = 1 − ζ for all i ≤ j, and E[Xi] = ζ for all i > j. Then, for all j ∈ [n], we have∥∥X(j−1,n) −X(j,n)∥∥
TV
= O
(
1
ζ
√
n
)
.
Proof. We use the following recursive formula for the probability mass function of a Poisson
Binomial Distribution, as described in [23]. Due to this not depending on j, we use X(∗,n) to
denote a sum of n independent 0/1 random variables whose expectations can potentially be
all different. Then if pn is the expectation of the n-th variable,
Pr
[
X(∗,n) = i
]
= (1− pn) · Pr
[
X(∗,n−1) = i
]
+ pn · Pr
[
X(∗,n−1) = i− 1
]
. (3)
We want to bound the total variation distance between X(j−1,n) and X(j,n), i.e.,
∥∥∥X(j−1,n) −X(j,n)∥∥∥
TV
=
1
2
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣Pr [X(j−1,n) = i]− Pr [X(j,n) = i]∣∣∣ .
Note that X(j−1,n) and X(j,n) differ only by how one coin flip is biased. Thus, we can use (3)
to write
Pr
[
X(j−1,n) = i
]
= (1− ζ) · Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = i
]
+ ζ · Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = i− 1
]
, and
Pr
[
X(j,n) = i
]
= ζ · Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = i
]
+ (1− ζ) · Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = i− 1
]
.
If we combine these with the total variation distance expression, we have the following ex-
pression for variation distance:
1
2
n−1∑
i=1
∣∣∣(1− 2ζ) · Pr [X(j,n−1) = i]− (1− 2ζ) · Pr [X(j,n−1) = i− 1]∣∣∣
=
(1− 2ζ)
2
n−1∑
i=1
∣∣∣Pr [X(j,n−1) = i]− Pr [X(j,n−1) = i− 1]∣∣∣ .
By definition of X(j,n−1) and Lemma 7.4 we know that Pr[X(j−1,n−1) = i] ≤ O( 1
ζ
√
n−1) for
any i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}. Let m be the mode of X(j−1,n−1). Due to X(j−1,n−1) being unimodal,
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we can split the sum
∑n−1
i=0 |Pr[X(j−1,n−1) = i]−Pr[X(j−1,n−1) = i− 1]| into two summations
over {0, . . . ,m} and {m + 1, . . . , n − 1} where Pr[X(j−1,n−1) = i] is, respectively, increasing
or decreasing and, hence, remove the absolute value operator. Consider the summation over
{0, . . . ,m}; the other case is symmetric. Then,
m∑
i=1
Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = i
]
− Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = i− 1
]
=
(
Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = 1
]
− Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = 0
])
+ . . .
· · ·+
(
Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = m
]
− Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = m− 1
])
= Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = m
]
− Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = 0
]
≤ Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = m
]
.
Summing up both the increasing and decreasing side bounds, we get that
n−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣Pr [X(j−1,n−1) = i]− Pr [X(j−1,n−1) = i− 1]∣∣∣ ≤
2 · Pr
[
X(j−1,n−1) = m
]
= O
(
1
ζ
√
n− 1
)
.
Substituting back to the variation distance expression and observing that 1 − 2ζ < 1, we
obtain∥∥∥X(j−1,n) −X(j,n)∥∥∥
TV
≤ O
(
1
ζ
√
n− 1
)
= O
(
1
ζ
√
n
)
,
as in the statement of the Lemma.
Definition 7.1. Let G = (n, 2, {uij}i∈[n],j∈{1,2}) be an anonymous game. For ζ > 0, the ζ-
smoothed version of G is a game G¯ = (n, 2, {u¯ij}i∈[n],j∈{1,2}) defined as follows. Let X(x)−i :=∑
ℓ 6=iXℓ denote the sum of n−1 Bernoulli random variables where x of them have expectation
equal to 1− ζ, and the remaining ones have expectation equal to ζ. The payoff u¯ij(x) obtained
by player i ∈ [n] for playing strategy j ∈ {1, 2} against x ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} is
u¯ij(x) :=
n−1∑
y=0
uij(y) · Pr
[
X
(x)
−i = y
]
= E
[
uij
(
X
(x)
−i
)]
.
Theorem 7.1. Let G = (n, 2, {uij}i∈[n],j∈{1,2}) be an anonymous game. For ǫ satisfying 1/ǫ =
O(n1/4), Algorithm 3 can be used to find (with probability ≥ 34) an ǫ-NE of G, using O(
√
n ·
log2 n) all-players queries (hence, O(n3/2 ·log2 n) single-payoff queries) in time O(n3/2 ·log2 n).
Proof. Set ζ equal to ǫ and let G¯ be the ζ-smoothed version of G. We claim that G¯ is a
λ-Lipschitz game for λ = O
(
(ζ
√
n)−1
)
. Let X
(x)
−i be as in Definition 7.1. By Lemma 7.5,
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Algorithm 3: Approximate NE general payoffs
Data: ǫ; query access to utility function u of n-player anonymous game G; parameters τ (failure
probability), δ (accuracy of queries).
Result: O (ǫ)-NE of G.
begin
Set ζ = ǫ. Let G¯ be the ζ-smoothed version of G, as in Definition 7.1.
// By Lemma 7.1 and Lemma 7.5 it follows that
// G¯ is λ-Lipschitz for λ = O(1/ζ
√
n).
Apply Algorithm 2 to G¯, simulating each all-players δ-accurate query to G¯ using multiple queries
according to Lemma 7.2.
Let p¯ be the obtained pure profile solution to G¯.
Construct p by replacing probabilities of 0 in p¯ with ζ and probabilities of 1 with 1− ζ.
return p.
end
∥∥∥X(x−1)−i −X(x)−i ∥∥∥
TV
≤ O
(
1
ζ
√
n
)
for all x ∈ [n− 1]. Then by Lemma 7.1, we have
∣∣u¯ij(x− 1)− u¯ij(x)∣∣ ≤ O
(
1
ζ
√
n
)
.
Theorem 6.1 shows that Algorithm 2 finds a pure-strategy 3(λ + δ)-WSNE of G¯, using
O(log n) δ-accurate all-players queries. Thus, Algorithm 2 finds a O( 1
ζ
√
n
+ δ)-WSNE of G¯,
where δ is the additive accuracy of queries.
Despite not being allowed to query G¯ directly, we can simulate any δ-accurate query to G¯
with a set of randomized all-players queries to G. This is done in the body of Algorithm 3.
By Lemma 7.2, for τ > 0, (1/2δ2) log(4n/τ) randomized queries to G correctly simulate a
δ-accurate query to G¯ with probability ≥ 1− τ .
In total, the algorithm makes O
(
log n · (1/δ2) · log(n/τ)) all-players payoff queries to G.
With a union bound over the 4 log n simulated queries to G¯, this works with probability
1− 4τ log n.
Once we find this pure-strategy O
(
1
ζ
√
n
+ δ
)
-WSNE of G¯, the last part of Algorithm 3
maps the pure output profile to a mixed one where whoever plays 1 in G¯ places probability
(1 − ζ) on 1, and whoever plays 2 in G¯ places probability ζ on 1. It is easy to verify that
the regret experienced by player i (that is, the difference in payoff between i’s payoff and i’s
best-response payoff) in G is at most ζ more than the one she experiences in G¯.
The extra additive ζ to the regret of players means that we have an ǫ-NE of G with
ǫ = O(ζ + δ + 1
ζ
√
n
). The query complexity thus is
O(log n · (1/δ2) · log(n/τ)).
Setting δ = 1/ 4
√
n, ζ = 1/ 4
√
n, τ = 1/16 log n, we find an O(1/ 4
√
n)-Nash equilibrium
using O(
√
n · log2 n) all-players queries with probability at least 3/4. We remark that the
above parameters can be chosen to satisfy any given approximation guarantee ǫ ≥ n−1/4,
i.e., simply find solutions to the equation ǫ = ζ + δ + (ζ
√
n)−1. This allows for a family of
algorithms parameterized by ǫ, for ǫ ∈ [n−1/4, 1), thus an approximation scheme.
The runtime is equal to the number of single-payoff queries and can be calculated as follows.
Calculating the value of φ(i) in Algorithm 2 takes O(n
√
n log n). We make O(
√
n log n) queries
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to G to simulate one in G¯, and once we gather all the information, we need an additional
linear time factor to count the number of players whose best response is 1. The fact that
the above part is performed at every step of the binary search implies a total running time
of O(n3/2 · log2 n) for Algorithm 2. Algorithm 3 simply invokes Algorithm 2 and only needs
linear time to construct the profile p; thus, it runs in the same time.
7.2 Lower Bound
Finally, we consider the question of lower bounds that are complementary to Theorem 7.1. We
use the minimax principle and thus define a distribution over instances that will lead to the
lower bound on query complexity, for any deterministic algorithm. We specify a distribution
over certain games that possess a unique pure Nash equilibrium. The n players that participate
in any of these games are partitioned into log n groups, which are numbered from 1 to log n.
Group i’s equilibrium strategy depends on what all the previous groups {1, . . . , i − 1} play
at equilibrium. Hence, finding out what the last group should play leads to a lower bound of
Ω(log n) all-players queries.
Definition 7.2. Suppose we need to discover an unknown bit-string A := A1 . . . Ad of length
d. A longest-common-prefix query (lcp) takes a bit-string B := B1 . . . Bd as input and outputs
the length of the longest common prefix between A and B, i.e., lcp(A,B) := maxj∈{0,...,d}{Ai =
Bi for all i = 1, . . . , j}.
Lemma 7.6. Let A := A1 . . . Ad be an unknown bit-string generated uniformly at random.
Then, the expected number of queries needed by any lcp-query algorithm is Ω(d).
Proof. We show by induction on q that the expected length of the longest common prefix
between A and the q-th queried bit-string is at most 2q. We use B(q) to denote the queried
input at step q.
Suppose A makes one query. Then, the expected prefix length is
E[lcp(A,B(1))] = Pr[A1 = B1] · 1 + · · ·+ Pr[A1 = B1 ∧ · · · ∧Ad = Bd] · d
=
d∑
i=1
i
2i
≤
∞∑
i=1
i
2i
= 2.
Thus, the base case holds. Now, assume E[lcp(A,B(q−1))] ≤ 2(q−1). Moreover, let A1 . . . A2(q−1) =
B
(q)
1 . . . B
(q)
2(q−1). Then,
E[lcp(A,B(q))] = 2(q − 1) +
d−2(q−1)∑
i=1
i
2i
≤ 2(q − 1) +
∞∑
i=1
i
2i
= 2q.
Hence, A needs to make at least d/2 queries in order to output a prefix of expected length
equal to d.
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Lemma 7.7. Let Gn be the class of n-player two-strategy anonymous games such that ui1(x) =
1−ui2(x) and ui1(x) ∈ {0, 1}, for all i ∈ [n], x ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}. Then, there exists a distribution
Dn over Gn such that every G drawn from Dn has a unique (pure-strategy) ǫ-WSNE.
Proof. Let n = 2k, and let the first n−1 players be partitioned into sets N1, . . . , Nk such that
|Nj| = n/2j for all j ∈ [k]. Let Ij :=
{
0, . . . , 2j−1 − 1}. Moreover, let 1 ≻xi 2 denote player i
preferring strategy 1 to strategy 2 given that x other players are playing strategy 1. We use
1 ≻IP 2 to mean that 1 ≻xi 2 for all i ∈ P and all x ∈ I. Furthermore, all players i ∈ Nj share
the same preferences.
We define Dn in the following manner. For all j ∈ [k], let Nj flip |Ij| fair coins, one
associated to each subset Sj,ℓ :=
{
ℓ
2j−1
n, . . . , ℓ+1
2j−1
n− 1}, with ℓ ∈ Ij, to decide whether they
prefer strategy 1 to 2 within Sj,ℓ. This means that Nj’s preferences over a subset Sj,ℓ do not
depend on what Nj prefer at some different Sj,m ⊂ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Player n, who belongs to
no set Nj, flips a coin for every ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. In particular, with probability 1/2, N1
always prefer strategy 1 to 2, and with probability 1/2, 2 to 1.
Every game G drawn from Dn has the feature of having a unique PNE. Moreover, Nj’s
unique best response at equilibrium depends on what N1, . . . , Nj−1 play. An application of
iterated elimination of dominated strategies suffices to verify the two claims. Further, it can
be shown, e.g., by induction on j, that in any ǫ-WSNE (ǫ < 1), no member of Nj would place
positive probability onto her worst-response.
Theorem 7.2. Let Gn be defined as in Lemma 7.7. Then, for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1), any randomized
all-players query algorithm must make Ω(log n) queries to find an ǫ-WSNE of Gn in the worst
case.
Proof. We use an adversarial distribution Dn over Gn and apply the minimax principle to
lower-bound the expected cost that any deterministic algorithm must incur. We let Dn be
defined as in Lemma 7.7, so that it has a unique ǫ-WSNE, and show that learning this
equilibrium is equivalent to learning an unknown log(n)-long bit-string as in Lemma 7.6.
If we associate a random indicator variable Yj to Nj that is equal to 1 if and only if Nj
are playing strategy 1 at equilibrium, then y :=
∑k
j=1 |Nj | · Yj corresponds to the number of
players playing strategy 1 that player n sees at equilibrium. It is easily verified that, by Dn’s
definition, Y := Y1 . . . Yk is generated uniformly at random since every group Nj flips a series
of fair coins to determine their preferences. Clearly, any algorithm A that outputs an ǫ-WSNE
of Gn is able to tell what Y ’s value is because it simply requires to look at what {1, . . . , n−1}
play in the pure equilibrium profile. Suppose an all-players query returns, for all i ∈ [n], both
payoffs for playing strategy 1 and 2 against x ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} other players playing strategy
1. This assumption can only strengthen the query model.
Let B := B1 . . . Bk be the binary representation of a query input x ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Due
to every player in Nj sharing the same preferences, we can assume the answer is of the form
A := A1 . . . Ak, where Aj is equal to 1 if and only if Nj’s best response to x is strategy 1.
We now argue that an all-players query is not able to give more information than the longest
common prefix between A and B.
Suppose A1 . . . Aℓ−1Aℓ+1 . . . Ak = B1 . . . Bℓ−1Bℓ+1 . . . Bk, and Aℓ 6= Bℓ for some ℓ ∈
{1, . . . , k − 1}. According to Dn’s definition, Nj flip a fair coin to determine their prefer-
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ences for every consecutive subset S ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1} of size n
2j−1
. Assume, w.l.o.g., that
Aℓ = 1 and Bℓ = 0. Let m ∈ {ℓ + 1, . . . , k − 1}. Nm’s payoff at x and Nm’s payoff at any
x′ such that |x− x′| ≥ n
2ℓ
correspond to two independent coin flips, i.e., it is useless to know
that Bj = Aj for all j ∈ {ℓ + 1, . . . , k} since Nℓ must play 1. Furthermore, any attempt to
guess Yℓ+1 . . . Yk fails with probability 1− 2ℓ+1−k.
For any random log(n)-long bit-string Y there exists a game G in the support of Dn whose
unique pure-strategy ǫ-WSNE is equal to Y . By Lemma 7.6, the expected number of queries
needed by any algorithm A to discover Y is Ω(log n).
8 Conclusions and Further Work
Our interest in the query complexity of anonymous games has resulted in an algorithm that has
an improved runtime-efficiency guarantee, although limited to when the number of strategies
k is equal to 2. Algorithm 3 (Theorem 7.1) finds an ǫ-NE faster than the PTAS of [15], for any
ǫ ≥ 1/ 4√n. In particular, for ǫ = 1/ 4√n, their algorithm runs in subexponential time, while
ours is just O˜(n3/2); however, our ǫ-NE is not well-supported.
An immediate question is whether we can obtain sharper bounds on the query complexity
of two-strategy games. There are ways to potentially strengthen the results. First, our lower
bound holds for well-supported equilibria; it would be interesting to know whether a logarith-
mic number of queries is also needed to find an ǫ-NE for ǫ < 12 . We believe this is the case at
least for small values of ǫ. Second, the ǫ-NE found by our algorithm are not well-supported
since all players are forced to randomize. Is there a query-efficient algorithm that finds an
ǫ-WSNE? Third, we may think of generalizing the algorithm to the (constant) k-strategy case
by requiring every player to place probability either ζk or 1 − k−1k ζ and solve an associated
Lipschitz game. However, in this case we can no longer use binary search to find a fixed point
of the smooth game. As a consequence, the query complexity is likely to be substantially
higher.
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